Intellectual Property Brief
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 1

2014

Look What They've Done to My Song, Ma: Jonathan Coulton,
Moral Rights, and a Proposal for the Reform of 17 U.S.C. § 115(A)
(2)
Joe Newman
Future of Privacy Forum

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Newman, Joe (2014) "Look What They've Done to My Song, Ma: Jonathan Coulton, Moral Rights, and a
Proposal for the Reform of 17 U.S.C. § 115(A) (2)," Intellectual Property Brief: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol5/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Intellectual Property Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Look What They've Done to My Song, Ma: Jonathan Coulton, Moral Rights, and a
Proposal for the Reform of 17 U.S.C. § 115(A) (2)

This article is available in Intellectual Property Brief: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol5/iss2/1

LOOK WHAT THEY'VE DONE TO MY SONG,
MA': JONATHAN COULTON, MORAL
RIGHTS, AND A PROPOSAL FOR THE
REFORM OF 17 U.S.C. § 115(A) (2)
BY JOE NEWMAN*

1. MELANIE, WAHAT HAVE THEY DONE To MY SONG MA, on CANDLES IN THE RAIN
(Buddah Records 1970); See also Miley Cyrus, The Backyard Sessions - Look What
They've
Done
To
My
Song,
YoUTUBE
(Oct.
4,
2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-aSpkaBeZckY; The Line of Best Fit, Of Montreal
- Look What They've Done To My Song Ma (Best Fit Sessions), YoU TUBE (May 22,
2012), http://www.yotitube.conl/watch?v-IvCGMVBTnTY; RAY CHARLES, LOOK WHAT
THEY'VE DONE To MY SONG, MA (Tangerine Records 1972).
* Joe Newman is a Legal and Policy Fellow at the Future of Privacy Forum,
where he writes on issues related to privacy in the digital age. He will also clerk for
Chief Judge Randall Rader of the Federal Circuit in spring 2014. Originally from the
Washington D.C. area, Mr. Newman received his B.A. in English and Music with
High Honors from Wesleyan University, and worked as a professional musician and
writer in San Francisco before receiving his J.D. with Honors at the George
Washington University Law School. Mr. Newman has written articles on a number of
different areas of intellectual property law, and was awarded the 2013 Jan Jancin
award by the AIPLEF for outstanding achievement in the field of IP law. The author
would like to thank Professor Kristelia Garcia for her invaluable help with this paper.
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ABSTRACT

In 1992, Anthony Ray, a.k.a. Sir Mix-A-Lot, released the song
"Baby Got Back."
The song, a "chart-topping multi-platinum
Grammy-winning hip-hop celebration of female pulchritude," is
widely considered a modern classic. In October 200-5, an artist
named Jonathan Coulton released a humorous "cover" arrangement
of "Baby Got Back" that retainedSir Mix-A-Lot's lyrics, but also added
new melodic and rhythmic material set against a smooth, folk-style
acoustic guitar-led accompaniment. Coulton's 'joke" arrangement
became an overnight viral hit due to the absurdjuxtaposition of Sir
Mix-A-Lot's lyrics and Coulton's crooning.
In January 2013, Fox's hit TV show "Glee" featured a cast
performance of "Baby Got Back," using a musical arrangement
indistinguishablefrom Coulton's version. When Coulton contacted
Fox's lawyers looking for an explanation, they responded by saying
that Fox was within its legal rights to reproduce Coulton's musical
arrangement at will. In the wake of this incident, it was soon
discovered that Coulton was but one of a troublingly large number of
independent arrangers whose work was featured in an episode of
Glee without acknowledgement, consent or compensation.
The story of Jonathan Coulton and Glee is both unusual and
complicated, involving a relatively obscure provision within the
Copyright Act's compulsory licensing scheme, 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2).
Section 115(a) (2) as it stands now is an unnecessary and draconian
provision that oppresses artists of all types. This paper will explain
how § 115(a) (2) functions, and how it hurts both arrangersand the
original artists of arrangedworks. Having established the numerous
structural and policy problems with the current regime, this paper
will propose a modest revision of the law, designed to better protect
both recordingartists and arrangers,and to advance the underlying
goals of the Copyright Act.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1992, Anthony Ray, a.k.a. Sir Mix-A-Lot, released the song "Baby
Got Back. ' 2 The song, a "chart-topping multi-platinun Grammywinning hip-hop celebration of female pulchritude, ' is widely
considered a modern classic, and has been named VHI's top one-hit
wonder of the '90s.4 Unsurprisingly considering its wide cultural
impact, the song has been lampooned and rearranged on a number
of occasions, including by Sir Mix-A-Lot himself' One artist's
humorous arrangement of "Baby Got Back" became the focal point of
one of the most interesting music-related controversies of 2013-an
incident that perfectly demonstrates the need to reform 17 U.S.C. §
115 (a) (2), a broken provision within the Copyright Act's current
compulsory licensing regime.
In October 2005, an artist named Jonathan Coulton released a
"cover" arrangement of "Baby Got Back" through his personal
website.' Although Coulton is not a traditional "mainstream" artist,
his witty, tongue-in-cheek compositions and arrangements have
earned him a strong and loyal following that has contributed well
over a million dollars in online sales to his website.7 As provided in
17 U.S.C. § 115, a compulsory license allows an artist to make and
distribute a cover arrangement of an existing song without
negotiating directly with the copyright holder, so long as the arranger
pays a set "mechanical royalty" (a certain percentage of each sale) to
the copyright owner (typically the original song's publisher).'

2.
3.

(Nov.

SIR MIx-A-LOT, BABY GOT BACK (Def American Records 1992).
Zach Kay, Sir Mix-a-Lot's 20th Anniversary, "Baby Got Back," Hip Hop PREss

15,

2011),

http://www.hiphoppiess.com/2011/11/sir-mix-a-lots-20th-

anniversary-baby-got-back.
4. VH1 's 40 Greatest One-Hit Wonders of the '90s, TOPONEHITWONDERS (May

8, 2011), http://toponehitwonders.com/1990s/vh ls-40-greatest-one-hit-wAonders-ofthe-90s/.
5. See, e.g., Advertisement: SpongeBob Squarepants Burger King_(2009),
available at__https://www.youttbe.com/watch?v-7gMZ62PsvRM; Robot Chicken:
Table Be Round (Cartoon Network television broadcast Oct. 5, 2008), available at
http://video.adultswim.com/robot-chicken/table-be-roind.html.
6. Baby
Got Back, JOCOPEDIA,
http://www.jonathancoulton.coi/wiki
/BabyGotBack (last modified Jan. 27, 2013).
7. See Jonathan Coulton, JOCOPEDIA, http://www.jonathancoulton.coi/wiki/
JonathanCoulton#cite note-1 (last modified Oct. 4, 2012).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2); FrequentlyAsked Questions, HARRY Fox AGENCY,
http://www.harryfox.com/public/FAQ.jsp#9 (last visited Api. 29, 2013). All of
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Coulton applied for and received a compulsory license from the
Harry Fox Agency prior to distributing his arrangement of "Baby Got
Back."
Coulton's arrangement of "Baby Got Back" retained Sir Mix-ALot's lyrics, but also added new melodic and rhythmic material set
against a smooth acoustic accompaniment.'
The intentionally
jarring juxtaposition of Sir Mix-A-Lot's suggestive lyrics and Coulton's
"soulful folkie crooning about his 'home boys' and how he 'likes big
butts and cannot lie"' was praised as "absolutely hilarious.""
Coulton's 'joke" arrangement became something of a viral hit; the
song was downloaded over 47,000 times during the weekend of its
release, and was also played on terrestrial radio. 2
In January 2013, Coulton discovered that Fox's hit television
show Glee was planning to feature his arrangement of "Baby Got
Back" in an upcoming musical number. 3 Glee is well known for
casting talented young performers who sing glee club renditions of
popular songs, frequently drawing humor from the juxtaposition of
serious or edgy source music with the wide-eyed, Broadway-style
performances of the glee club singers. 4 Season four, episode eleven
of Glee"5 featured a cast performance of "Baby Got Back,"" using an
Coulton's original songs are distributed under a Creative Commons BY-NC license,
which allows those who download the song to freely share and remix the work so
long as they provide proper attribution and do not use the work for commercial
purposes. The Mp3 Store, JONATHAN Coulton, http://www.jonathancoulton.com/
store/downloads/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); see also Attribution NonCommercial
3.0 Unported, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://cieativecomionis.org/licenses/bync/3.0/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). However, as a licensed cover song, Coulton's
"Baby Got Back" does not use the Creative Commons License. See The Mp3 Store,
supra note 8.
9. Jonathan Coulton, Baby Got Back and Glee, JONATHAN COULTON (Jan. 18,
2013), http: //www.jonathancoulton.coi 2013 /01/18 /baby-got-back-and-glee/.
10. See Cory Doctorow, Nerd Folksinger Covers Baby Got Back, BOINGBOING
(Oct. 15, 2005, 10:43 AM), http://boingboing.net/2005/10/15/nerd-folksingercove.html.
11. Id.
12.

Jonathan Coulton,

Wowie ZoWie, JONATHAN COULTON

(Oct.

18,

2005),

http: /w/AAA.jonathancoulton.coM /2005 /10/18/wowie-zowie/.
13. Coulton, Baby Got Back aid Glee, supra note 9.
14. (lee - About, Fox Broadcasting, http://www.fox.com/glee/about/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2014).
15. Glee: Sadie Hawkins (Fox television broadcast Jan. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.amazon.coi/Sadie-Hawkins/dp/BO0B5Q4YRS.
16. Danger Guerrero, 'Glee' Ripped OffJonathan Coulton Aid Said He Should
Be "Happy For The Exposure," WAARMING GLOW
(Jan. 25,
2013),
http: //www.uproxx.coi tv /2013 /01/ glee-i-ipped-off-jonathan-coitlton-and-said-he-
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arrangement virtually indistinguishable from Coulton's folk version.' 7
Fox never contacted Coulton before it aired the episode, and
never gave him compensation or attribution in the show's credits,
despite the fact that the two arrangements sound nearly identical.
Fox also sold recordings of its arrangement of "Baby Got Back" on
the iTunes digital store, again without crediting or compensating
Coulton.19 When Coulton contacted Fox's lawyers looking for an
explanation or apology, they responded by saying that Fox was within
its legal rights to reproduce Coulton's musical arrangement at will,
and that Coulton should be happy for what the "exposure" that
having his song featured on Glee would do for his career. 20 Coulton
sarcastically commented about Fox's response in his blog: ". . . they
do not credit me, and have not even publicly acknowledged that it's
my version-so you know, it's kind of SECRET exposure.1"21 In the
wake of this incident, it was soon discovered that Coulton was but one
of a troublingly large number of independent arrangers whose works
have been adapted for episodes of Glee without the arrangers'
acknowledgement, consent, or offer for compensation.22 Coulton
should-be-happy-foi-the-exposure/.
17. See id. (containing side-by-side comparisons of the two songs). Not only did
Glee's version copy Coulton's new melody, harmony, rhythm, and accompaniment,
but the version even contained the line 'Johnny C.'s in trouble," which Coulton had
changed from "Mix-A-Lot's in trouble" in the original hip-hop version. This change,
which makes little sense in the context of the Glee episode, effectively rules out any
defense that the similarity between the songs was the result of pure coincidence. See
Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2003) ("It is in
order to avoid having to prove access that mapmakers will sometimes include a
fictitious geographical feature in their maps; if that feature (what is called in the
trade a 'copyright trap') is duplicated in someone else's map, the inference of
copying is compelling.").
18. Guerrero, supra note 16 (quoting Laura Hudson, Did Glee Rip Off a
Jonathan Coulton Cover of 'Baby Got Back'?, WIRED (Jan. 18, 2013 7:40 PM),
http: //xA\AA.wired.com /underwire /2013 /01/ glee-coulton-baby-got-back/ ).
19. See id. (quoting Coulton, Baby Got Back and Glee, supra note 9).
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Coulton, Baby Got Back and Glee, supra note 9). Fox never
apologized to Coulton formally or informally, and the Glee version of "Baby Got
Back" remains on the iTunes store with no official acknowledgement of Coulton's
involvement. See id. Coulton's angry fans responded by posting extremely negative
reviews of the Glee performance of "Baby Got Back" on iTunes. Patricia Hernandez,
Pissed-OffJonathan Coulton Fans Review-Bomb Glee's 'Baby Got Back,' KOTAKIT
(Jan. 31,
2013),
http://kotaku.com/5980619/pissed+off-jonathan-coulton-fansieview+bomb-glees-baby-got-back. Meanwhile, in a creative use of extrajudicial selfhelp, Coulton rereleased his cover version on iTunes under the title "Baby Got Back
(in the style of Glee)," and donated the sizeable proceeds to charity. See id.

22. Michelle Jaworski, Serial Song Theft on "Glee"? "Baby Got Back" Wasn't the
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considered legal action, but lamented that "it's the darkest gray of the
gray areas [of the law] ... it doesn't seem like something where a
little guy could sue to get any satisfaction."2 3
Critics condemned Fox's consistent pattern of appropriating the
work of small independent musicians such as Coulton.2 ' Even the
staunchest supporters of an "open access" system of copyright believe
that one should not be allowed to copy another's creative work
verbatim for commercial gain, against the owner's consent, and
without any attribution.' Therefore, it seems odd that the Copyright
Act would permit this type of appropriation. The story of Jonathan
Coulton and Glee is unusual and complicated, involving a relatively
obscure provision within the Copyright Act's compulsory licensing
scheme. 6 A number of parties today are actively looking for ways to
2 7
reform our current copyright system for the new digital economy.
First, THE DAILY DOT (Jan. 25, 2013), http://,A AA.dailydot.com/entertainment/gleeripping-off-jonathan-coulton-dj-earworm/
(suggesting that other arrangements
potentially stolen include an a capella version of Usher's "Yeah" created by University
of Oregon group "Divisi," a piano ballad version of Cyndi Lauper's "GirlsJust Wanna
Have Fun" arranged by Greg Laswell, and a mash-up arrangement of "Fly" and "I
Believe I Can Fly" by artist DJ Earworm).
23. Laura Hudson, Jonathan Coulton Explains How Glee Ripped Off His Cover
Song And Why He's Not Alone, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2013, 3:21 PM),
http: //TA AA.wired.com /underire /2013 /01/jonathan-coulton-glee-song/.
24. See, e.g., id.; Jaworski, supra note 22; Mike Masnick, Broken Copyright:
Jonathan Coulton Is Actually Infringing Copyright, But Glee Is Not, TECHDIRT (Jan.
30,
2013,
9:39
AM),
http://TAAA.techdirt.com/articles/20130129/16045921819/broken-copyrightjonathan-coulton-is-actually-infringing-copyright-glee-is-not.shtml
(condemning the
absurdity of a copyright system that leads to the result in the Glee controversy). But
see Mike Madison, Coulton, Glee, and Copyright, MADISONIANNET (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://iadisonian.iet/2013/01/28/coulton-glee-and-copyiighit/
(arguing
that
Coulton's history of "having relied on voluntary contributions from fans and others
to support his career" and creating a "gift economy" for his music renders his ethical
claims for attribution and compensation invalid).
Even if Madison's ethical
arguments are correct, they apply only to Coulton and other artists that offer their
arrangements for free, and not to other arrangers who attempt to profit from their
arrangements.
25. See Peter Suber, Open Access Oven 'iew, EARLHAi
(Dec. 16, 2013),
http://legacy.earlham.edu /-peters/fos/overview.htm ("Most authors [who embrace
open access] choose to retain the right to block the distribution of mangled or
nisattributed copies.
Some choose to block commercial re-use of the work.
Essentially, these conditions block plagiarism, misrepresentation, and sometimes
commercial re-use, and authorize all the uses required by legitimate scholarship,
including those required by the technologies that facilitate online scholarly
research.").
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2) (2012).
27. See, e.g., The Register's Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Couits, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of the H.
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This article proposes a reform to the current compulsory licensing
statute, specifically the reform of § 115(a) (2), which as it stands now,
is an unnecessary and draconian provision that oppresses artists of all
types.
This article will explain how § 115(a) (2) functions, and how it
hurts both arrangers and the original artists of arranged works.
Having established a number of problems with the current regime,
this article will propose a modest revision of the law, designed to
better protect recording artists and arrangers, and to advance the
underlying goals of the Copyright Act.
ANALYSIS: 17 U.S.C. § 115 (A) (2) AND THE MULTIPLE LEVELS OF
DERIVATIVE-WORK PROTECTION

Understandably, given the complexity of the surrounding law,
not all commentators writing about the Coulton/Glee incident have
described the current law accurately.
For instance, some
commentators have explained that Fox's copying was permissible
because "[y]ou don't retain copyright on things like the style in
which you sing or the instrumentation or things that are unique to
the recording. '2 This assertion is somewhat misleading because it
does not consider the features of Coulton's arrangement that are
eligible for protection.
Coulton created substantial original melodic material, set to the
lyrics of Sir Mix-A-Lot's song which, as a rap, contained virtually no
melody, and also created a completely original musical
accompaniment with guitars, banjos, etc.
It is well established
under 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) that an author may generally claim

Comm. on the Judiciay, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante,
Register
of
Copyrights,
U.S.
Copyright
Office),
available
at
http://,A AwA.copyright.gov/regstat/2013/regstat03202013.html
(suggesting
that
major reforms are needed to update U.S. copyright law in the twenty-first century);
THE DEP'T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY,
AND
INNOVATION
IN
THE
DIGITAL
ECONOMY
(2013),
available at

http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/copyiightgieenpapei.pdf
(discussing a
variety of contemporary copyright issues).
28. See Jaworski, supia note 22 (quoting Parker Higgins of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation).
29. Compare SIR MIx-A-LOT, BABY GOT BACK (Def American Records 1992), with
Baby Got Back, supra note 6.
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independent copyright protection in any material fixed in a
derivative work that is "contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work."3
Furthermore, Congress specifically contemplated in 17 U.S.C. § 101
that a new "musical arrangement" of an existing work could receive
protection as a "derivative" work)' In the absence of any applicable
law revoking protection, Coulton has a recognized copyright interest
in the original, expressive features of his arrangement) 2 Coulton
would then receive at least "thin" copyright protection in the original
melodic and harmonic features of his arrangement, which would be
protected at a minimum against "virtually identical" copying.33 As
previously mentioned, the Glee and Coulton arrangements of "Baby
Got Back" are virtually identical.3 ' Although it is generally rare in
practice that a finding of "thin" copyright will lead to a finding of
infringement, 5 the overwhelming similarities between the Coulton
and Glee versions of "Baby Got Back" could well have supported such
30. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) ("[P]rotection for a
work employing preexisting material inwhich copyright subsists does not extend to
any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully."); Well-Made
Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 147, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd
sub nomr. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 354 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2003),
abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) ("[D]erivative
works receive copyright protection separate from that of the preexisting works they
modify. ....
");Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992(AHP), 2002 WL 485730, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) ("To determine whether a derivative work possesses the
requisite originality, courts must compare the derivative work to the preexisting work
and define which elements are new to the derivative work."). While it is true that "a
work involving changes (such as reproduction in another medium) requiing only
'manufacturing' or 'physical' skill, as opposed to 'artistic' skill, does not merit
protection as a derivative work," creating a new arrangement of an existing song
usually involves artistic skill. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 210 F.
Supp. 2d 147, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp. 630
F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980)).
31. 17 U.S.C § 101 ("A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement ...or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." (emphasis added)).
32. Cf.17 U.S.C. § 103; Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spitits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining the concept of "thin" copyright protection).
33. See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an
artist's derivative jellyfish sculptures are entitled to "thin copyright that protects
against only virtually identical copying").
34. See, e.g., Aaron Pound, Musical Monday - Baby Got Back by Jonathan
Coulton (with Paul & Storm), DREAMING ABOiT OTHER WORLDS (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://dieamingaboutotherwo-lds.blogspot.coi/2013/01/musical-monda-babygot-back-by.html ("[H] eye is the virtually identical Glee version.").
35. See Satava, 323 F.3d at 812 (recognizing that the scope of "thin" protection
will be narrow).
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a finding had this case gone to ajury."
The real reason Coulton would lose in a summary judgment
battle against Fox is not because his work is not the kind of work
copyright law protects, but rather, due to a separate rule found in the
compulsory licensing statute, 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
Section
115 (a) (2), applicable specifically to musical works, provides:
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a
musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the
performance involved, but the arrangementshall not change
the basic melody or fundamental character of the work, and
shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work under
this title,
except with the express consent of the copyright
7
owner.

The second half of § 115(a) (2) is made up of two clauses, which
reveal a number of extremely important implications for arrangers
when unpacked.
These implications can be grouped into two
categories: liabilities and rights. The liabilities and rights of an
arranger depend on both the character of his or her arrangement,
and whether express consent has been obtained from the original
work's copyright owner.
The first of the two clauses prohibits arrangers from creating
works that "change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
[underlying] work."3 Under this clause, if an arrangement is
generally
true
to the
original
author's vision-a
"weak
arrangement"-it qualifies for a compulsory license. The license
shields the work from infringement liability so long as the arranger
pays the obligatory royalties. On the other hand, if an arrangement
changes the basic melody or fundamental character of the underlying
work-a "strong arrangement"-the remix creator exceeds the
privilege of making an arrangement and is thus ineligible for a
compulsory license. Without this license, the creator of the strong
arrangement will be left open to an infringement suit on behalf of
the original copyright owner.:
36. See e.g., Pound, supra note 34 (one of many lay listeners finding the versions
to sound "virtually identical").

37.

17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2) (emphasis added).

38.
39.

Id.
See § 106 ("[T] he owner of copyright under this title has the CxcilusiVe rights
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The second clause of § 115(a) (2) affects the arranger's rights in
his or her newly created arrangement. Under the second clause of
the statute, arrangements of a musical work "shall not be protected as
a derivative work under this title" absent the explicit consent of the
copyright owner.40 The second clause (outlining rights) is
independent from the first clause (outlining liabilities) due to the use
of the conjunction "and."
This suggests that all new musical
arrangements are affected by the "rights" clause, regardless of
whether or not the arrangement changes the fundamental character
of the original work under the "liabilities" clause. 4' In other words, a
work may be eligible for a compulsory license-shielding the
arranger from liability-but ineligible for protection as a derivative
work dcue to a lack of consent from the original song's copyright
owner. 2 It also means that any arrangement, weak or strong, may
receive copyright protection for newly-added elements if the arranger
obtains the express consent of the copyright owner.4"
Adding another wrinkle to this regime is the concept of "fair
use," which provides that a use of a work "for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching.., scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright."4 4 An arrangement
• . . to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work .
(emphasis
added)).
40. §115(a)(2).
41. Because § 115(a) (2) affects the entire musical arrangement, it makes musical
derivative works unique as compared to all other derivative works protected by
copyright law. In contexts other than music, '[i]f the derivative author can isolate
some part of her work that does not make unauthorized use of the prior work, she
can preserve copyright in that part .... " BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 92 (2012); see § 103(a).
However, under section
115(a) (2), the arrangement as a whole is excluded from copyright protection absent
the explicit consent of the author (or a finding of fair use).
Note that the arranger is still able to claim protection in any sound recordings that
are created by a performance of his oi her arrangement, assuming the rights in the
underlying musical work(s) have been lawfully obtained. Coulton initially thought
the Glee version of "Baby Got Back" contained audio taken directly from his
recording of the arrangement, which Coulton correctly concluded would have
generated a cause of action against Fox. See Hudson, supra note 23.
42. §115(a)(2).
43. See §§ 103, 115(a) (2); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th
Cir. 2003) (explaining that "thin" copyright protection protects against virtually
identical copying). For most musical works, the protection offered by section 103
will be particularly "thin" due to the amount of the arrangement that is contributable
to the underlying work (particularly its lyrics)). See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805,
812 (9th Cir. 2003).
44. § 107.
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that qualifies as a fair use does not infringe the original work.4 ' A
finding of fair use also allows the arranger to bypass compulsory
licensing and the prohibitions in § 115 (a) (2) altogether; the arranger
receives protection for any newly added material under the general
provisions for derivative works in § 103 (b).4
Courts considering fair use utilize a four-part balancing test that
considers, inter alia, the "purpose and character" of the new
arrangement (in other words, how much it "transforms" the
fundamental character of the original work).47 In Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the fair use factors
with respect to 2 Live Crew's song, "Pretty Woman," a commerciallyreleased hip-hop comedy version of Roy Orbison's classic rock song
"Oh, Pretty Woman."4 While not ruling on whether the song was a
fair use, the Court nonetheless recognized that 2 Live Crew's
arrangement could constitute a transformative parody despite its
commercial nature.
Notably, 2 Live Crew conceded at the outset of
the case that it was not entitled to a compulsory license under §
115 (a) (2) because "its arrangement change [d] 'the basic melody or

45. Id.
46. See § 103; Keeling v. New Rock Theater Prods., LLC, No. 10 CIV. 9345(TPG),
2013 WL 1899762 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2011) (holding that in the context of nonmusical works, the creator of a fair use parody has a recognized copyright interest
and may site others for copying the parody); see also § 106(3) (granting the exclusive
right to sell copies of a work); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 57172 (focusing on "Oh, Pretty Woman" as a "commercial parody").
Although section 103(a) provides that "protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which
such material has been used unlawfully," a fair use is affirmatively "authorized by
law." See § 103(a); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
Moteover, copyright protection for works created via fair use was
explicitly contemplated in section 103's legislative history: "[u]nder this provision,
copyright could be obtained as long as the use of the preexisting work was not
Iunlawful'-even though the consent of the copyright owner had not been obtained.
For instance, the unauthorized reproduction of a work might be 'lawfll' under the
doctrine of fair use or an applicable foreign law, and if so the work incorporating it
could be copyrighted." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 58 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 1561 (emphasis added).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 ("The central purpose of this
investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely
Isupersede[s] the objects' of the original creation, or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative."') (internal citations omitted).
48. Campbell,510 U.S. at 571-72.
49. Id. at 583.
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fundamental character' of the original [Orbison song]."5
Section 115 (a) (2) creates a complex web of rules, with a number
of variables, each leading to a drastically different outcome for the
arranger.
The following table takes the analysis above and
summarizes what appears to be the current state of the law.

50. See id. at 575 n.5. On remand, the parties settled-2 Live Crew simply
agreed to pay royalties under a standard license agreement. See Peter Friedman,
What Happened After the Remand of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, WHAT IS FAIR USE
(May. 30, 2008, 4:43 PM), http://whatisfaiiuse.blogspot.con/008/03/whathappened-after-remand-of-campbell.html (quoting The Associated Press, Acuff-Rose
Settles Suit With Rap Group, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (June 5, 1996)).
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Type Of Transformation
WEAK arrangement, no
express consent:
preserves melody and
fundamental character of
original work
STRONG arrangement, no
express consent:
transforms the fundamental
character of the original work
(but is not a fair use)

Legal
Classification
Cover song
tinder § 115

Arranger's Legal Status
T hibilitv

'1

Riot

Unauthorized
derivative work
under
§ 115(a) (2)

FAIR USE arrangement, no
express consent:
transforms the fundamental
character of the original work
and is a fair use (ex: parody)

Derivative work

WEAK arrangement, WITH
express consent

Cover song
tinder § 115

STRONG arrangement, WITH
express consent

Authorized
derivative work
under
§ 115(a) (2) and

FAIR USE arrangement
WAITH express consent

Derivative work
under
§ 103(a)

tinder

§ 103(a)

§ 103(a)

It is clear that without the express consent of the copyright
holder, the arranger faces harsh consequences-that is, unless his
new work is considered a fair use. Applying these rules to the case of
Jonathan Coulton and Glee: Fox would argue that even though
Coulton paid the compulsory licensing fee for his version of "Baby
51. In this table, a lightly shaded cell corresponds to a positive outcome for the
arranger, a medium-shaded cell represents something of a compromise between the
interests of arranger and original composer, and the darkly-shaded cells represent a
negative outcome for the arranger.
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Got Back," he (lid not obtain Sir Mix-A-Lot's express consent to
create his arrangement and therefore has no rights for his
arrangement as a derivative work. Fox would then likely argue that
because Coulton's arrangement was unprotected, Fox was free to
2
copy Coulton's arrangement at will.'
ARGUMENT: SECTION 115 (A) (2) MUST BE REFORMED

Section 115(a) (2) is fundamentally broken and must be reformed
for the twenty-first century. This section must be rewritten in order
to better achieve the goals set out by Congress when drafting it;
namely, "to recognize the practical need for a limited privilege to
52. In this scenario, whether Coulton's arrangement is "weak" or "strong" only
affects his liability to Sir Mix-A-Lot for infringement, and has no relevance to his
rights against Fox. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2).
However, it seems reasonable to argue that Coulton's version of "Baby Got Back" was
actually a fair use parody of Sir Mix-A-Lot's original, which would obviate the need
for a license altogether. In much the same way that 2 Live Crew's parody "Pretty
Woman" 'juxtaposes [Orbison's] romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes
true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from
paternal responsibility," Coulton's version of "Baby Got Back" juxtaposes Sii Mix-ALot's degrading taunts and bawdrx demands for sex with a musical accompaniment
and melody suggesting the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583; Doctorow, supra note 10 (finding the humor inherent in
Houlton's "soulful folkie crooning about . . . how he 'likes big butts and cannot
lie"'). Although the thrust of Coulton'sjoke was delivered solely through his choice
of musical accompaniment (as opposed to 2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman," which
delivered its joke mainly by rewriting Orbison's lyrics), it nonetheless seems clear
that "a parodic character" in Coulton's work directed at the Sir Mix-A-Lot original
"may easily be perceived," which could lead a court to find fair use when considered
alongside the other factors. C~anpbell, 510 U.S. at 582 ("The threshold question
when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may
reasonably be perceived.").
But see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), ("[A] rap version of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or 'Achy Breaky
Heart' is bound to make people smile. If we allow any weak transformation to qualify
as parody, however, we weaken the protection of copyright.").
If it is correct that Coulton's version of "Baby Got Back" was fair use, Coulton was
under no obligation to pay a compulsory license, and would be able to site Fox for
infringing the thin copyright in his new arrangement. On the other hand, as a
matter of strategy, if Coulton's version of "Baby Got Back" was found to be a "strong
arrangement" rather than a fair use, Coulton would risk not only losing his case
against Fox but also being declared liable as an infringer of Sir Mix-A-Lot's original
composition. Coulton likely decided to pay the compulsory license because he was
unwilling to risk so much on a fair use defense: "[b]ecause liability is difficult to
predict and the consequences of infringement are dire, risk-averse intellectual
property users often seek a license when none is needed." James Gibson, Risk
Aversion and Rights Accretion in hItellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 882
(2007). Whether the result of risk aversion or simply confusion as to his rights,
Coulton has not filed suit against Fox, and so we are left without much-needed clarity
as to the applicability of the fair use doctrine.
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make arrangements of music being used under a compulsory license,
but without allowing the music to be perverted, distorted, or
travestied.""
Section 115(a)(2) fails to achieve this goal and the
underlying goals of the Copyright Act for three reasons. First, the law
is too difficult to practically implement. Second, the law creates an
unjust windfall for third-party infringers, which in turn encourages
the creation of "travestied" works. Third, insofar as the law was
designed to protect musical integrity, it is unnecessarily and
dangerously broad.
A. Section 115(a) (2) is too unclear to be practical.
The

confusion

surrounding

Coulton's

case

and

the

misinformation circulated about the legal issues at play suggest that
many artists who create arrangements are unlikely to be fully
informed of their rights under the current regime. 5' As the chart in
section II shows, the web of rules flowing from the language of §
115(a) (2) is complicated-arguably unnecessarily so-and there is a
real possibility that uneducated arrangers suffer as a result."
In addition to being incomprehensible to most artists, the
current regime under § 115(a)(2) is not practically administrable.
The first issue in a § 115(a)(2) analysis-whether or not the
arrangement changes the "fundamental character" of the underlying
work-forces a court to consider questions completely outside of its
area of competence. It is "a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges" of an
artistic work's character .56 By way of comparison: it is already well
known that the distinction between fair use and infringement "is
often not clear," creating uncertainty both within the court and the
general publicY7

As compared to the question of fair use, the

53. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 109 (1976).
54. See infra Part II.
55. See generally Gibson, supra note 52 (explaining how risk aversion will likely
scare artists into licensing when their use may not require paynent);Jaworski, supra
note 22 (explaining that many artists have been confronted with similar issues in
licensing and risk aversion to their detriment).
56. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.").
57. See Frequently Asked Questions, HARRY Fox AGENCY, supra note 8. This
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"fundamental character" standard is even more vague and difficult to
apply. What is the "fundamental character" of "Baby Got Back"?
How is a court supposed to apply such a standard, much less an
arranger uneducated in the law?
In the few cases that actually apply § 115(a)(2), courts have
simply left the question of a work's "fundamental character" up to the
jury, which is no better equipped to discuss a musical work's
character (and may be particularly susceptible to manipulation) .
For instance, in TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. DM Records, Inc.,5' the court
held that the significance of the arranger's alterations with respect to
the fundamental character of the underlying work presented "issues
of fact" that could not be decided on summary judgment 0
Unsurprisingly, the parties in that case settled rather than try the
issue before a jury.) Considering the costs of going to trial and the
lack of predictability (or musical expertise) of most jurors, few
arrangers are ever able to know whether their arrangement of
another's work runs afoul of § 115(a) (2)'s prohibition."
Because §
115(a)(2)'s "fundamental character" test presents a question with
extremely important implications, but no administrable guidelines
for either the general public or the courts to follow, it follows that the
law must be reformed.
B. By revoking an unauthorized cover's copyrightpro tection, §
115 (a) (2) creates an unfair windfall for deliberatelyinfringing third
parties.
When an arranger fails to secure the copyright holder's consent
prior to creating a cover arrangement, § 115(a)(2) deprives the

uncertainty has a particularly adverse effect on artists that lack sufficient resources to
afford adequate legal guidance.
See also Gibson, supra note 52, at 903 n.75
(discussing the copyright lawyer's incentive to avoid the risk of relying on fair use).
58. See Jamie R. Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test
In
Music
Composition
Copyright
Infringement,
JLUNDLAW,
http://,A,.jundlaw.com/p/music-copyright-project.html
(last visited Feb. 20,
2014) (documentingjurors' susceptibility to gamesmanship and manipulation when
asked to assess the similarities between works in copyright lawsuits).
59. 05 C1V. 5602 (JGK), 2007 WL 2851218, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007).
60. Id. at *7.
61. See Stipulation Of Dismissal And Order at 8, TVT Music, Inc. v. Rep Sales,
Inc., 1:05CV05602 (S.D.N.Y. Mai. 5, 2012).
62. Telephone interview with Paul Fakler, Partner, Arent Fox (Jan. 17, 2014)
(noting the lack of case law or other guidance defining "fundamental character").
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arranger of all his or her rights against all other third parties. This
regime, which in practical terms serves only to enrich third-party
infringers, is contrary to the goals of the Copyright Act, and
moreover, is fundamentally unfair.
The injustice created by § 115 (a) (2) is clearly illustrated by Fox's
actions toward Jonathan Coulton and the numerous other artists
whose work was stolen for use in Glee. 3 By relying on § 115(a) (2),
Fox would argue that it cannot be held responsible for violating
Coulton's rights in his arrangement because Coulton failed to obtain
the explicit consent of Sir Mix-A-Lot years earlier. Such a result does
not provide justice to Sir Mix-A-Lot, who is unaffected by any suit
between Fox and Coulton, and it does not provide justice to Coulton,
who loses all rights in his arrangement. Meanwhile, Fox obtains a
substantial windfall. Copyright should enrich artists and authors, not
deliberate copiers. A system of copyright that leads to such a result is
in dire need of repair."4
C. Insofar as § 115(a) (2) was intended to create a moral right for
artists, the statute is poorly crafted to meet that goal.
The legislative history for § 115 (a) (2) provides that the provision
"is intended to recognize the practical need for a limited privilege to
make arrangements of music being used under a compulsory license,
but without allowing the music to be perverted, distorted, or
travestied. '' 1 5 This goal of preventing songs from being mutilated
strongly suggests that Congress was trying to create a sort of "moral
right."6 6 In the United States, "moral rights" typically refer to a

63. See generally Hudson, supra note 23.
64. One might draw parallels between § 115(a) (2) and the doctrine of patent
misuse (or "unclean hands"): under that doctrine, the "patentee [is prevented] from
taking legal action against infringers (and thus prevents the patentee from obtaining
his reward) because of ajudgment that the patentee has done something wrong" to a
wholly unrelated party in another proceeding. Mark A. Lemley, The Economic
Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. RV. 1599, 1615 (1990).
Such a regime has been harshly criticized as "economically irrational," because it fails
to provide relief to either the original intellectual property owner whose rights were
violated, or to the person asserting his rights against the third party. Id.
65. H.R. RP. No. 94-1476, at 109 (1976).
66. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. RnV. 1, 38-39 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rip. No. 94-1476,
at 109); see also GeriJ. Yonover, The PrecariousBalance: Moral Rights, Parody, and
Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 79, 97 (1996).
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collection of rights given to the author of an artistic work, designed
6 7
to ensure the integrity of both the artist and his or her creation.
Included among these traditional moral rights is the right "to prevent
revision, alteration, or distortion of [an artist's] work,"")& a goal that
closely parallels Congress' stated intent in drafting § 115(a)(2).
Unlike in many European countries, the United States generally has
chosen to keep the scope of moral rights extremely narrow,
applicable only in specific cases and often only to purely visual works
of art. 7
However, in the drafting of § 115(a)(2), Congress was
apparently concerned that absent protection, unscrupulous cover
artists could destroy the integrity of treasured original works through
71
disrespectful arrangements.
At this point, it is worth noting that there has been no shortage
of discussion as to whether or not a system of moral rights is a good
idea as a matter of policy.72 While many artists believe that an artist's
connection with his or her work is sacrosanct and thus entitles the
author to control the work's fate,7" other critics have argued that
strong moral rights impede innovation and raise the specter of
censorship if they give the author too much power to control who
may build off the work. 4 It is ultimately unnecessary to dive into that
debate here. Regardless of one's opinions about moral rights, one
can still see that § 115(a) (2) is overbroad and clumsy, and has the
potential to hurt authors as easily as it may help them. When
compared to the parallel protections in the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990 (VARA),75 § 115 (a) (2) 's shortcomings become clear.
67.

Betsy Rosenblatt, Moral Rights Basics, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET &

http://cybei.law.iarvard.edu/pioperty/libia-y/moralprime.itnil
visited Apr. 29, 2013).
SOCIETY,

68.

(last

Id.

69. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 109.
70.

See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990).

The statute is also known as the Visual

Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), and applies exclusively to visual art. Id.
71.

See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 109; Rosenblatt, supra note 67.

Compare Cassandra Spangler, Comment, The Integrity Right of an MPJ:
How the Introduction of Moral Rights into U.S. Law Can Help Combat Illegal Peerto-Peer Music File Sharing, 39 SETON HALL L. REv. 1299, 1300 (2009) (advocating
moral-rights protection for musical artists in the United States), with Amy M. Adler,
Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 263, 265 (2009) (arguing that moral rights
72.

impede artistic progress).
73. Spangler, supra note 72, at 1300.
74. See Adler, supra note 72, at 265.

75. § 106A.
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1. The protections of§ 115(a)(2) vest in the copyright holder, not the
originalartist.
Under VARA, "[e]ven if the author has conveyed away a work or
her copyright in it, she retains the moral [rights] to the work."7
Under § 115(a)(2), the opposite is true. Once the original artist
conveys his or her copyright interest in his composition, he or she
loses the ability to provide consent with respect to future
arrangements.
Meanwhile, the arranger must seek the express
consent of the "copyright owner," as opposed to the original artist of
77
the song.
Within the music industry, it is extremely common for an artist
to assign her copyright in a song to a music publisher upon
completion of the work.78 In some cases, the music publisher and the
artist's record label (which owns the right to exploit the audio
recordings of the song) are the same entity.tm It is also unfortunately
common in the music industry that the record label's desires do not
align with the artist's, particularly with respect to issues of artistic
integrity."0 If a record label owns the copyright to the artist's original
composition, it will likely refuse to give consent for any cover that it
feels could pose a threat to the original song within the marketplace.
The record label's incentives are typically based on the market and
unrelated to any notion of artistic integrity or moral entitlement,
which moral rights are supposed to protect. If § 115(a) (2) were truly

76. Rosenblatt, supra note 67; § 106A(d), (e) (1).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2) (1990).
78. See
Music
Publishing 101,
NAT'L
MUSIC
PUBLISHER'S
ASS'N,
https://www.nmpa.org/legal/musicl0l.asp
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014) ("In
exchange for acquiing the copyright, a portion of the copyright, or a percentage of
the revenue earned from the exploitation of the musical composition, the music
publisher seeks opportunities to exploit the musical composition ....").
79. See Ethan Trex, The Time John Fogerty Wias Stied for Ripping Off John
Fogerty,
MENTALFLOSS
(Apr.
13,
2011,
8:03
PM),
http://mentalfloss.com/article/27501/time-john-fogei-ty-was-sued-ripping-johnfogerty (describing a case in which John Fogerty of Creedence Clearwater Revival was
stied by his former label (and publisher) for allegedly plagiarizing one of his old
songs).
80. See, e.g., Stephen Adams, Pink Floyd Stops EMI from Cutting up Albums
Online,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
11,
2010,
1:45
PM),
http://AwA.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/music-news/7421247/Pink-Floyd-stopsEMI-fiom-cutting-up-albums-online.html (stating the band members of Pink Floyd
successfully sued their label to prevent their albums' tracks individual sale on digital
stores. Anticipated disagreement about issues of "artistic integrity" led the band to
negotiate specific clauses in their contract to protect these interests).

2014]

LOOK WHAT THEY'VE DONE TO MY SONG,

MA

designed to protect the integrity of artists, it would have put the
power to consent to derivative works in the hands of the artists
responsible for the work, as opposed to solely with the copyright
owner.

2. Section 115(a)(2) creates a burdensome, "opt-in" regime.
Under § 115(a)(2), the power to consent to a derivative
arrangement rests with whoever holds the copyright to the original
song. This creates a burden on an arranger to locate and negotiate
with the copyright holder for consent, often many years after the
original song is first released. Section 115(a) (2)'s consent regime is
"opt in" when it should be "opt out." By default, an arrangement is
not protected unless the copyright holder gives his or her express
consent. In other words, the law presumes the copyright holder has
withheld consent for any arrangements until he or she expressly
states otherwise.
This default "no covers allowed" setting does not comport with
modern
songwriters'
general
attitudes
towards
derivative
arrangements. Most modern songwriters understand that if their
music is to stand the test of time, others will necessarily adapt and reimagine their work; countless artists in a wide variety of genres have
thus embraced and encouraged the production of transformative
covers.8 1 While there are certainly some musicians who object81.

See John Dolen, Interview with Dylan: 09/29/95, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN
(Sept.
29,
1995),
available
at
http://,A A.interferenza.net/bcs/interw/florida.htm (replying to a question about
Jimi Hendrix's coveI of his song "All Along the Watchtower," Bob Dylan replied:
"[Jini] had such talent .... He found things that other people wouldn't think of
finding in there. He probably improved upon it b} the spaces he was using. I took
license with the song from his version, actually, and continue to do it to this day");
RZA Digs Justin Bieber "Runaway Love" Remix, MuSICIANS ENTOURAGE (Sept. 14,
2010),
http://musiciansent.com/2010/09/rza-digs-justin-bieber%E2%80%9Cninaway-love%E2%80%9D-remix/
(rapper RZA approving of a
remixed arrangement of Wu-Tang song "Wu-Tang Clan Ain't Nuthing ta F' Wit,"
combined with the vocals ofJustin Bieber song "Runaway Love"); Chris Vinnicombe,
Trent
Reznor
talks Johnny
Cash,
MusICRADAR
(Aug.
5,
2008),
http://www.musici-adair.com/us/news/guitai-s/treint-reznor-talks-joiny-cash-168199
(describing the reaction of Nine Inch Nails frontman Reznor upon hearing Johnny
Cash's arrangement of the Nine Inch Nails song "Hurt": "It really, really made sense
and I thought what a powerful piece of art"); Douglas Wolk, Beck's New 'Song
Reader' Album, and Destroy It Yourself Music, MTVHIVE (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.mtvhive.coii/2012/12/12/beck-song-ieadei/
(artist Beck encouraging
SENTINEL
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perhaps reasonably-to unauthorized covers, 2 this small minority
ought not to be treated as the default position in the twenty-first
century.
Moreover, placing the burden on arrangers to locate the original
artists they cover is impractical. For the vast number of so-called
"orphan works"-works for which the copyright owner cannot be
located even after a reasonably diligent search-obtaining the
copyright owner's consent to make a cover will be effectively
impossible. 3 This problem of "orphaned" copyrighted works is
growing ,7M and is particularly troublesome because under §
115(a)(2), the copyright owner's consent is a prerequisite for the
arrangement of a copyrighted work to have any legal protection
against third parties.
It is reasonably likely that Sir Mix-A-Lot would have approved of
Jonathan Coulton's humorous folk version of "Baby Got Back" had
Coulton approached him directly-after all, Sir Mix-A-Lot is not
opposed to the lampooning of his song or of his own hip-hop
persona in his own self-parodies (or indeed, on Glee). 6

Moreover,

internet users to create their own arrangements of his new album: "[plersonalizing
and even ignoring the arrangements is encouraged. Don't feel beholden to what's
notated.
Use any instrument you want to. Change the chords; rephrase the
melodies . . . Play it for friends, or only for yourself."); Robert Wright, Intoduction
to Alchemy:
A Study of Tom Waits through Cover Songs, EMPTY MIRROR,
http://www.emptymir1orbooks.com/features/tom-waits-cover-songs.htnil (last visited
Jan. 19, 2014) ("Most songwriters view their songs as "children" or "babies," implying
a paternal bond of care and affection, while the cover artist's relationship to the song
is that of spouse or lover, a union of intimacy and desire, seeking completion and
fulfillment from someone else's creation.").
82. Prince Hates Random Stars Covering His Songs, ACESSHOWBIZ (April 14,
2011, 6:05 PM), http://TAwv.aceshowbiz.com/news/view/wOO11693.html
(artist
Prince criticizing the power compulsory licensing gives other artists to cover his
songs).
83. See Qiphan Works and Mass Digitization, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 15,
2013), http://www.copyiight.gov/orphian/
(announcing an effort to collect
comments regarding the problems created by orphan works and possible
resolutions).
84. See id.
85. See infira Part 111.(B).
86. See, e.g., Advertisement:
SpongeBob Squarepants Burger King_2009);
Robot Chicken: Table Be Round (Cartoon Network television broadcast Oct. 5,
2008), available at http://video.adultswim.com/robot-chicken/table-be-iound.html.
Sir Mix-A-Lot had to have given his express approval in order to allow Fox to publicly
perform the folk version of "Baby Got Back" on Glee. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)
(2012) (compulsory license applies only to phonorecords); § 115(c)(3)(1)
(compulsory license does not cover public performances (including by means of
digital transmission), and thus direct negotiation is needed). Given that Sii Mix-A-
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Sir Mix-A-Lot would be especially unlikely to prevent Coulton's
arrangement from reaching the market, when doing so would mean
foregoing the not-insubstantial royalties Coulton pays upon each sale
of his arrangement. 7 Nevertheless, because § 115(a)(2) requires
affirmative and express consent, Sir Mix-A-Lot is presumed to have
disapproved of all new arrangements of his work, and Coulton's
arrangement is unfairly punished as a result.
3. VARA conditions recovery on a showing ofprejudice to the artist's
integrity or reputation,whereas § 115(a)(2) does not contain this important
safeguard.
Under VARA's rights of attribution and integrity, a visual artist
has the right "to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation."88
Under § 115(a)(2) however, the
copyright holder may refuse to consent to the protection of a new
derivative work for any reason, regardless of whether the cover
arrangement would harm the artist's reputation. s
There is no reasonable justification for giving copyright holders
more power to withhold consent under § 115 (a) (2) than visual artists
currently have under VARA. The limitation in VARA is important
because without it, a copyright holder could sue to stop production
of a new work whenever it modifies the original in a way that the
copyright holder simply does not like. This power to withhold
consent, even unreasonably, is incredibly powerful and is easily
abused; 0 therefore, it should be tempered.

Lot did not object too strenuously to the Glee version, it seems unlikely that lie
would have objected to Coulton's version.
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(3) (A) (emphasis added).
89. Cf. id. § 115(a) (2); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 109 (1976).
90. See Mike Masnick, Prince Sends A Takedown Over Six Second Vine Clips,
TECHDIRT
(Apr.
3,
2013
7:53
AM),
http: //www.techdirt.com/ articles/ 20130402 /18194922552/ prince-sends-takedownover-six-second-vine-clips.shtml (describing artist Prince's "irrational" tendency to
object to any use of his work on the Internet, regardless of the use's likely effect on
his reputation).
Furthermore, the power of consent under the current regime
affects both the arranger's liabilities and rights against third parties, making it
extremely powerful. See infra Part II, IJ. (B).
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SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

Although the previous section points out many flaws in §
115(a)(2),91 this article does not go so far as to argue that this
provision ought to be removed in its entirety. Trying to protect the
artistic integrity of music creators is a noble goal. One could imagine
a situation in which an obnoxious cover song could in fact cause the
original work to be "perverted, distorted, or travestied" in such a way
that a mechanical royalty would be insufficient compensation.!2 For
example, a hypothetical musician who writes a sincere love ballad
might justifiably feel upset if Coca-Cola then were to write an
obnoxious "dubstep" arrangement of his work without his consent
3
and then use it to sell Coca-Cola products during the Super Bowl
Even

assuming

Coca-Cola

does

not

imply

the

hypothetical

products, 9'

musician's endorsement of Coca-Cola
one can imagine
the musician could reasonably feel as though his own reputation was
damaged if listeners later heard his original arrangement and their
minds immediately drifted to the Coca-Cola commercial and its
corporate message.2 Section 115(a) (2) provides a real benefit to the
integrity of the artist by discouraging the creation of these highly
distorted works.

91. See infra Part III.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 109 (1976).
93. "Dubstep" is a genre within electronic dance music characterized by loud,
reverberating electronic bass.
See Dubstep-Define Dubstep, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browAse/dubstep (last visitedJan. 13, 2014).
94. Courts aheady provide relief under the Lanham Act when a user mutilates an
original work and then falsely attributes the mutilated work to the original artist or
implies that the original artist endorsed the new work. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am.
Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24-26 (2d Cir. 1976) (Monty Python creator prevailing
against ABC for airing a heavily edited version of the show and implying that Monty
Python created or endorsed it).
95. To give another example, one might also feel that the classic B.J. Thomas
single "Hooked on a Feeling" (Scepter Records 1968), was subsequently "travestied"
by the infamous David Hasselhoff cover in 1999. (AllMusic 1999). See also Matthew
Perpema, 12 Songs Republicans Used Without Permission, BIZZFEED MUSIC (Aug. 17,
2012, 2:11 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.coi/peipetua/12-songs-republicans-usedwithout-permission (describing musicians who objected to the use of their
compositions in campaigns run by politicians the artist disagreed with); Henry L.
Self, MoRAL RIGHTS AND MUSICLANS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003-2004 ENT'M, PUB. &
THE

ARTs

HANDBOOK

165,

1

(2003),

available

at

http://www.lavelysinger.com/MoralRights.pdf (describing how pop singer Connie
Francis, a rape victim who suffered from years of mental instability, objected to her
label Universal licensing her songs for use in sexually themed motion pictures).
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When passing § 115(a)(2), it appears then that Congress was
concerned about preventing the harm that occurs when an artist's
song is "perverted, distorted, or travestied."" If so, the statute should
be revised to better address that harm. Section 115(a) (2) should
therefore be rewritten as follows:
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a
musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the
performance involved. However, the license may be revoked
if the artist of the originalwork or his assignees can show that
material prejudice to the artist or song's integrity or
reputation will result from distribution of the new
arrangement.
The new language above effectively addresses each of the problems
pointed out in Part III.
A. The proposed law is clearerand easier to administer.
The new language eschews any vague discussion of the
"fundamental character" of the underlying work in favor of a
standard that relies on material prejudice to the integrity or
reputation of the original artist or song, similar to the standard under
VARA.97 Under the new standard, a jury would have to decide
whether the artist or song's reputation had been sufficiently injured
to warrant revoking the arranger's compulsory license. Establishing
damage to an artist or song's reputation could be accomplished using
evidence and arguments analogous to the ones employed for cases
brought under VARA, the Lanham Act, or common-law defamation,
such as public opinion polls, news coverage or sales numbers."
While this standard is not without its own set of interpretative
96. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 109.
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (3) (A) (2012) (" [T]he author of a work of visual art.
shall have the right ... to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation.").
98. Cf.Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (recognizing "trial
courts have wide experience in fiaming appropriate jury instructions in tort actions,"
and suggesting that juries can understand the impact of many different types of
injury even apart from actual out-of-pocket expenses).
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challenges, quantifying reputational harm is at least a question that
requires little or no musical expertise. Additionally, the proposed law
would impose a requirement that the plaintiff show "material"
prejudice to his or her integrity or reputation. This standard would
ensure that the artist's interest in integrity is respected, while
preventing the plaintiff from haphazardly punishing an arrangement
merely because he or she disapproves of it.
B. The proposed law correctly eliminates the provision that revokes
copyrightprotection for unauthorizedcover arrangements.
Cover arrangements should receive, at minimum, "thin"
copyright protection to protect against those who would otherwise
obtain a windfall by making virtually identical copies. Under the
proposed law, a cover arrangement will be protected as a derivative
work against infringing third parties by default, unless the original
artist revokes that protection by showing material prejudice to his or
her reputation or the reputation of the song.!"') If the original artist
successfully proves that the cover would be materially prejudicial and
that the arrangement is infringing without a valid license (i.e., there
is no fair use), then the cover arrangement forfeits copyright
protection - not under the revised § 115, but rather under section
103(a).I .. By removing the existing deterrent on those who make
expressive arrangements, the proposed law would spur the growth of
these new creative arrangements, which in turn would result in

99. Note that in cases where multiple artists have contributed to a work, a
supermajority should be required to bring suit under the revised statute, unless there
is a pre-existing contractual relationship between the artists covering these types of
issues. See generally Roberta R. Kwall, 'Author - Stories": Narrative's Implications
for Moral Rights and Copyright'sJoint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37
(2001) (discussing the many difficulties applying moral rights doctrine to works with
multiple authors).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) ("[P]irotection for a work employing preexisting material
in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully."). Additionally, the proposed regime allows an
arranger whose work does not qualify for a compulsory license to nonetheless claim
protection for any elements of his arrangement that are independent from the
original infringing coinposition-for example, if the arranger adds a new verse with
a new melody to an otherwise infringing arrangement. See BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER,
COPYRIGHT: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 92 (2011) ("[11f the derivative author can
isolate some part of hier work that does not make unauthorized use of the prior work,
he can preserve copyright in that part; otherwise, her work falls into the public
domain.").

2014]

LOOK WHAT THEY'VE DONE TO MY SONG,

MA

artistic progress, as well as additional royalties for the beneficiaries of
the compulsory licenses.0 1 Applying the law to the Glee facts, Fox
would pay a compulsory license royalty directly to Coulton for using
his arrangement. 10 2 Coulton would then forward a portion of that
royalty to Sir Mix-A-Lot for arranging his original song.1"3
C. The proposed law vests the default power to object to an
arrangementin the original artist or his or her assignees, ratherthan
solely in the copyright holder.
Rather than requiring the express consent of the copyright
holder, the proposed regime allows only the artist or his or her
assignees to object to an arrangement of their original work. The
purpose of reallocating the ability to bring suit is simply to grant
more power to artists to preserve the integrity of their work. The
power should also be given to the artists' assignees, including heirs if
they exist.1 0 While it is true that VARA protection ends with the
death of the author,0 ' allowing the proposed right to exist
posthumously is also a necessary compromise in order to protect the
investment of a third-party copyright owner such as a publisher or
101. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2).
102. Mechanical License Royalty Rates, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/caip/m200a.pdf (last updated Jan. 2010) (stating the
current statutory rate is 9.1 cents or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time or fraction
thereof, whichever is larger).
103. It is helpffl to further explain the fee structure that the proposed law would
create. In order to allow Coulton to retain some portion of the royalty, it would be
necessar y to create a new statutory rate foi "covers of covers." The default rate could
be 4.55 cents, allowing for a 50-50 split in royalties between Coulton and Sir Mix-ALot. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2) ("[T]he royalty under a compulsory license shall be
payable for every phonorecord made and distributed in accordance with the
license."). This is a fair split in the Glee scenario, because both Coulton's and Sir
Mix-A-Lot's creative contributions were necessar y to inspire the Glee version. In this
scenario, the Fox version of "Baby Got Back" is "in accordance with" the compulsory
license between Coulton and Sir Mix-A-Lot, and thus would be treated as a "sale"
subject to royalties. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2).
One might argue that not all derivative arrangements are so transformative so as to
deserve a fifty percent royalty share; however, the 4.55 cent rate could only apply in
the fairly rare case where ajudge determines that an arrangement contains elements
that both (a) qualify foi independent copyright protection, and (b) have been
infringed upon by a third party.
104. Society arguably has an interest in preventing material prejudice to an artist
or song's integrity, even if the composing artist has died-fans and family of the
deceased artist may be justifiably outraged to hear the songs of a recently deceased
artist immediately repurposed to endorse products that the artist denounced while
she was alive.
105. See Rosenblatt, supra note 67.
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label, which would likely not invest in as many developing artists if it
believed it could not control the market for derivative works after the
artists' death (when such a right is often quite valuable).
Publishers may object to this proposed change because it
appears to take away their right to control the derivative works
market. However, an analysis of the proposed rule shows that the
practical effects of this change would actually be minimal. Assuming
the artist has transferred his or her copyright interest to a publisher,
but not assigned the right to object under the new law,"t) there are
only three ways the artist-publisher relationship can play out.
In the first, the artist and publisher's interests will be aligned:
both the publisher and artist object to the new arrangement. In this
scenario, there is no meaningful change from the current regime; the
label will agree to bring suit on behalf of the artist in order to prevent
the distribution of the disrespectful cover. In the other two other
scenarios, the interests of the artist and publisher diverge. In the
second scenario, the artist objects to the creation of a derivative work
but the label approves of it. Even if the artist prevails against the
derivative arranger and revokes the arranger's compulsory license,
the publisher can simply provide the arranger with a direct license,
allowing the new arrangement to be distributed against the artist's
wishes. As such, the ultimate outcome in this scenario is essentially
the same as it is under current law. While perhaps frustrating to the
artist, this would be a fair result: if the artist has conveyed to the
publisher the right to make money off his or her work, the artist's
right to integrity ought not to trump the label's ability to pursue that
economic interest through licensing.0 7

106. Note that a record label could always stipulate in its standard contracts that
the signing artist must consent to assign its integrity right to the publisher.
Nonetheless, the publisher siting on the artist's behalf will still be required under the
proposed law to show damage to the artist or song's reputation, rather than simply
showing damage to the song's viability in the marketplace. That said, a showing of
market harm might be useful in proving harm to the artist or song's reputation.
It remains an open question under this theory how often artists will actually contract
away this right to object to covers of their works. The value of the fight granted by
the proposed law might vary wildly depending on the genre of music involved and
the independent legal resources of the contracting artist; this makes the right an
ideal term for case-by-case bargaining.
107. If the artist's moral rights always took precedent over the label's economic
interest, it would greatly reduce the value of the copyright for the label.
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In the third scenario, the publisher wishes to sue an arranger but
the artist or his or her assignees does not. Unlike in the previous two
scenarios, this marks a change to the current regime. Here, the
publisher could not prevent the new derivative work from being
distributed under the compulsory license without the original artist's
consent. Although losing some control over the derivatives market
may frustrate the publisher, this would be a justifiable outcome; a
publisher with only an economic interest in a song ought not to be
able to prevent new works from being distributed solely by relying on
rights derived from the artist's moral rights.""1
If no legal remedies
were available, at least the copyright owner could console itself with
the royalties generated from a successful derivative work produced
under the compulsory license." '
D. The proposed law changes the consent regime from "opt-in" to
"opt-out."
The proposed

law effectively shifts

the burden

from the

arranger, who currently must affirmatively seek permission in order
to receive protection for a derivate work, to the original artist, who
would have to police for cover arrangements that harm the artist's
integrity. There are a few justifications for this change. The first is
that, practically speaking, the latter situation-in which the artist
polices for unauthorized covers-is already the status quo."0 Many
arrangers do not seek compulsory licenses when releasing their
arrangements, preferring instead to release their work unlicensed
and hope that no one sues them for infringement."' With that fact

108. If the artist's moral rights never took precedent over the label's economic
interest, it would greatly reduce the value of the copyright for the artist.
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2).
110. See Masnick, supra note 90; Music PublisherSilences Scores of Videos in Spat

with

You Tube,

THE

ELECTRONIC

FRONTIER

FOUNDATION,

https://www.eff.org/takedowns/music-publisher-silences-scores-videos-spat-youtube
(last visited Apr. 30, 2013) (Warner Music issuing a takedown notice to YouTube to
remove videos of "[o]ne fan's a capella tribute to the film music of John Williams,"
and "[a] teenager singing 'Winter Wonderland' for her friends"). While the average
teenager would not be able to pay a judgment in an infringement case, a teenager
would be able to pay royalties on the profits they derive from a successful
arrangement.
111. Telephone interview with Paul Fakler, Partner, Arent Fox (Jan. 17, 2014).
See also Dale Turner, The Cover Song Quagmire: Three Ways to Obtain Mechanical
Licenses, for Legally RecordinglDistributingCover VeIsions or CD, INTIMAITEAUDIO,
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in mind, formally acknowledging the creator's duty to police does not
make his or her situation any worse than it already is.
The second argument is again that copyright holders benefit
greatly from compulsory licensing royalties.
Incentivizing new
derivative works under the compulsory licensing umbrella will
ultimately increase the original artists' revenues."2 In today's remixcentric society,113 both artists and copyright holders should look to
maximize these sources of revenue, not discourage them. A cover of
a song that goes viral has the potential to make both the original
artist and the arranger very rich.'
Allocating to the artist the burden
of objecting to inappropriate covers is a fair tradeoff for encouraging
the distribution of new, often lucrative covers.

CONCLUSION

It is often difficult to balance the rights of an author to maintain
his or her artistic integrity with the rights of the public to rearrange
and adapt the artist's work. Music is not merely a commodity sold
like a toaster; artists put a piece of themselves in their musical works,
and therefore suffer legitimate harm when a cover artist perverts,
distorts, or travesties their work. At the same time, the desire to
protect an artist's personal connection to his or her work should not
lead the law to punish innovative arrangers who advance art through
new and creative arrangements of existing songs. As much as society
http://A A,.intimateaudio.com/cover-song-quagmire.html
(describing
the
extremely lengthy, complicated and expensive process all artists must go through in
order to properly give notice under the current compulsory licensing scheme, and
suggesting that reading the "overwhelningly incomprehensible (to my neophyte
self) U.S. Copyright Office web site . . . was almost enough to make me toss in the
towel (and my cookies)").
112. See 17U.S.C. § 115(c)(2).
113. See generally Kirby Ferguson, Everything is a Remix, EVERYIHINGISAREMIX
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (containing a four-part video on the prevalence of remix
culture in both the past and present).
114. See, e.g., Storytellers: Bruce Stringsteen Storytellers 'Devils And Dust' and
'Blinded
B)
The
Light'
(VH1
television
broadcast),
available
at
http://TAAwAT.vhl.com/video/misc/177957/storytellers-devils-and-dust-and-blindedby-the-light.jhtml (Bruce Springsteen explaining how the Manfred Mann cover of
"Blinded By The Light" was Springsteen's only song to hit number I "-which I
appreciate"); See also Dylan Moore, Top 10 Cover Songs More Famous than the
Original, TOPTENZ, http: //www.toptenz.net/ top-i 0-coveir-songs-more-famous-thanthe-original.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) (cataloging highly successful cover
arrangements, many of which enriched both the covet artist and original composer).
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wants to protect artists, some of the greatest and most beloved
American songs were actually innovative covers built from lesserknown compositions.'
Section 115(a) (2) as it is currently written is badly out of balance,
hurting both original and derivative artists, while at the same time
creating a gaping legal loophole allowing entities like Fox to
deliberately appropriate the creative contributions of independent
artists. Rather than eliminate the law entirely, the proposed statutory
reform will correct this imbalance, protecting the rights of all artists
while incentivizing the creation of novel derivative works. The
proposed law effectively fixes the problems of the existing regime
while striking an equitable balance between all stakeholders. With
the adoption of the proposed language, the copyright system will be
better able to foster the creation of a diverse and vibrant library of
music.

115.

See Moore, supra note 114.

